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Legal Responsibility Under Tort Law
Of School Personnel and School Districts as
Regards Negligent Conduct Toward Pupilst
By Rfl~oLs C. S5r*
THE TITLE selected for this article is likely to startle the discerning
reader. It is rather apparent that adequate treatment of the suggested
subject matter would more readily lend itself to a full length volume
t The thrust of this article is the discussion of the law as it touches public school
personnel and school districts. The material, however, which deals with the duties that
rest on individual teachers has equal application to teachers in the private school. Of
course, in the religious school the individual teacher who is a religious has no money
and is, therefore, judgment proof. The recourse, however, may be against the corpora-
tion that operates the private school unless the jurisdiction holds to the immunity doctrine
of non-profit, eleemosynary, charitable institutions. The article will reveal that more
school districts are losing governmental immunity against tort action. The tide of judicial
thinking is also beginning to run in the direction of abrogating immunity of private
schools, even one operated by a church. The many cases involving liability of private
hospitals are of significance in this respect. See for a more direct example the 1963 Wis-
consin case, Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W.2d 249,
254 (1963), which, although involving a church corporation, gives indication that the
rule of immunity of a private school against actions based on a claim of negligence is
very likely abolished. The language of the court is significant:
There can be no quarrel with the argument [that] the public benefits
generally from the work of religious institutions.... [Tihe question is whether
the benefit to the many should be at the expense of the innocent sufferer of
injuries caused by the negligence of an agent of the religious institution....
Certainly institutions teaching divine justice, the dignity of man and his obliga-
tion to his fellowmen ... would not claim .. . they ought to be exempt from
repairing the injury done by themselves or their agents to another....
We do not believe the result of abolishing immunity... casts any insuper-
able financial burden upon them. .. . [They can minimize the burden by
insurance.]
* Dean and Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; formerly Assistant
Superintendent of Public Schools in Omaha, Nebr., and St. Louis, Mo., specialist in
School Law, formerly taught School Law at Northwestern University as Associate Pro-
fessor; recently President, National Organization on Legal Problems of Education; fre-
quent contributor and lecturer on School Law.
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rather than a law review article. Realistically, therefore, the approach
has been to select for discussion those areas of exposure which may
likely present the greatest possibility of risk of liability.
A further technique has suggested itself. An article of this nature
will have maximum usefulness if in addition to being a helpful guide
to school board attorneys, it has meaning to teachers, administrators
and school board members. Since many of the individuals in the
latter categories do not have a professional foundation in legal educa-
tion, the approach will at times present basic material which may not
be customary in articles which are designed to be read almost exclu-
sively by trained legal scholars and lawyers.
There is full justification for giving enough slant to an article of
this type so that teachers, administrators and school board members
can find meaning in it. The primary reason, although the danger does
exist, is not to alert school personnel and school boards to the threat
of recovery of money damages. The basic justification is that school
personnel have as much reason to safeguard children against injury
resulting from harm induced by breach of duty as they have to protect
young people from the result of an improper psychological approach
to teaching.
The Position of the Individual Teacher
And School Administrator
In society generally an individual must take reasonable care to avoid
acts or omissions which he can reasonably foresee would be likely to
injure his neighbor. If he does not, he subjects himself to the proba-
bility that he will be required by a court to pay money damages to
an injured party. Under tort law a neighbor is one who is so closely
and directly affected by an act that an individual ought reasonably to
have had him in contemplation as being affected when he was direct-
ing his mind to acts or omissions. A negative statement serves to
emphasize the principle. There are some people to whom an individual
owes no duty to be concerned about his conduct. The concept of
whether a duty is owed is a question of law for a court to determine.
Courts have generally recognized that pupils fall within the category
of neighbors so as to cause teachers and administrators to have them
in contemplation when they act or omit to act.
Under familiar principles of tort law the concrete duty imposed
by this attitude is that teachers and administrators must act toward
pupils as would the reasonable, prudent person or parent under the
circumstances. This standard does not make teachers the insurers of
the safety of children. If school personnel have acted as the reason-
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able, prudent parent under the circumstances and nevertheless a
child is injured, the teacher or administrator cannot be held respon-
sible. The teacher and administrator are not liable for pure accidents.
It is obvious that the determination of negligence measured by the
yardstick of whether teachers and administrators acted toward pupils
as the reasonable, prudent parent would do under the extremely com-
plex circumstances found in varied school situations is not simple. It
is far more difficult than the application of the same yardstick to the
conduct of the driver of an automobile.
Since a great majority of fact situations alleging negligence on the
part of teachers are going to present an issue which will not warrant
a court directed verdict either in favor of the plaintiff or the defend-
ant, a jury is most frequently going to be directed to work with the
yardstick of determining whether a teacher or administrator did such
acts or omitted "to take such a precaution that under the circumstances
present he, as an ordinarily prudent person, ought reasonably to [have
foreseen] that he will thereby expose the interest of another to an
unreasonable risk of harm."'
In facing up to the difficult question of whether in a particular
situation liability should attach because of the conduct of a school
teacher or administrator there are some principles of tort law that may
have significant application.
In discussing probability of harm resulting from a certain type of
conduct authorities in tort law have pointed out that as the gravity of
the possible harm increases, the apparent likelihood of its occurrence
need be correspondingly less.2 This explains why, although the odds
may be 1,000 to 1 in favor of an automobile driver going 90 miles an
hour not meeting a train at a railroad crossing, the risk of death is
sufficiently serious to impose upon him more caution. Does this prin-
ciple suggest, however, that often a teacher or administrdtor, as a
defense to an allegation that his action was negligent and produced
harm to a pupil, could assert that since the gravity of possible harm
is not great, it is proper to think in terms of statistical odds on harm?
Another concept in tort law expresses the attitude that against the
probability and gravity of risk must be balanced the utility of the type
of conduct in question.3 The recognized problem here is whether the
game is worth the candle and the realism of appreciating that some-
times risk may reasonably be run with the full approval of the com-
munity.
I Part of the instruction in Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 242, 234 N.W.
372,379 (1931).
2 PnossEa, ToaRs 121-22 (2d ed. 1955).
3 Id. at 122.
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The disclosure of the yardstick which will be put into the hands
of jurors and the particular principles to which attention has just been
drawn suggests the difficulty of predicting the jury reaction to a par-
ticular school fact situation in which negligence of school personnel
is alleged. Even appellate courts may differ on the matter as to
whether a jury verdict should be let stand.
This uncertainty as to outcome points to the reasonableness of
giving advice to school personnel which leans toward the conservative,
with the qualification that the advice should not be so cautious as to
put the educator in the kind of a legal strait jacket which would have
an undesirable effect upon the ability of children to learn and develop
responsibility.
In the light of what has been stated, and to the extent that space
will permit, it now seems desirable to discuss some of the kinds of
fact situations which arise in the school field.
Duty to Supervise in General
It is obvious that many questions concerning liability can arise
out of situations where it is alleged that the pupil was injured during
a period when a teacher failed to supervise.
Fortunately the operation of schools has not produced anything
like the amount of litigation found in the area of the use of the auto-
mobile. It is, therefore, often necessary to speculate as to outcome of
cases alleging failure to properly supervise. This is done through the
application of basic principles and by analogy suggested by certain
decided cases. As previously indicated, the approach here adopted
is a reasonably conservative one. In spite of the liberality of certain
courts, as portrayed in immediately following paragraphs, prudence
dictates offering advice to school personnel which will be calculated
to keep them out of the hands of juries. Unless there is a meaningful
educational goal to be attained, it does not seem wise to encourage
teachers or administrators to probe to see if juries and courts will
follow the pattern of some liberally decided cases.
The New York case, Ohman v. Board of Educ.,4 will serve as an
introduction to a discussion of the responsibilities of teachers and ad-
ministrators in respect to supervision. In Ohman the trial court had
found a teacher negligent on evidence that she had been out of the
room to which she was assigned for the purpose of sorting papers and
storing materials for perhaps an hour and fifteen minutes. During the
time she was gone a thirteen year old boy was struck in the eye by a
pencil hurled by a pupil at a particular classmate who ducked to avoid
4 300 N.Y. 306, 90 N.E.2d 474 (1949).
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the object. The appeal court felt the absence of the teacher was not
the proximate cause of the injury and, therefore, concluded that the
length of absence was immaterial. The court talked about the act of
the third party as one which could hardly have been anticipated in
the reasonable exercise of the teacher's duty toward the plaintiff. This,
the court felt, was because there was no proof of similar accidents.
Also, the court asserted that it could not be contended that a pencil
in the hands of a school pupil is a dangerous instrumentality. The
event, stressed the court, could have occurred equally as well in the
presence of a teacher as during her absence. Two dissenters in the
Ohman case argued most persuasively that the jury could properly
conclude that if a teacher left a room full of children unsupervised,
there could be horseplay which could result in injury to a pupil.
The position of the dissenters and the jury seemed utterly sound.
Certainly the reasonable, prudent teacher can foresee that when she
leaves a normal sized room containing thirteen year olds, especially for
an extended period of time, the psychology of group behavior will
induce some horseplay which would result in injury. It seems utterly
immaterial that the pencil was thrown at one pupil and hit another.
While it is true a similar event could have happened while the teacher
was in the room, carefully supervising, and there would have been no
liability, the chances of the episode taking place were greatly height-
ened by the absence of the teacher from the room. There is no require-
ment that the teacher foresee the exact injury that would take place
in her absence. True, there must be a relationship between the absence
from the classroom and the injury. The happening in Ohmran is in no
way similar to that where a boy might be injured because he bumped
his head in a basketball game while the teacher was out of the gym-
nasium. It could realistically be said in such case that the absence
of the teacher from the gymnasium had nothing to do with the injury.
If there is any rational explanation for the majority viewpoint in
the Ohmran case, it would seem to rest on the presumption that in
terms of statistical odds the likelihood of possible harm was not great.
It seems, however, that this principle, standing alone, should not be a
valid defense to excuse lack of supervision. Some reasonable showing
of the utility of the conduct would appear to be required.
All courts, however, are not requiring it. In Ohio5 the court held
that a teacher who was out of the room was not negligent when one
pupil threw a milk bottle which struck another pupil in the head,
causing him eventually to lose the sight of one eye and impairing the
vision of the other. On the other hand all courts do not accept the
5 Guyten v. Rhodes, 65 .Ohio App. 163, 29 N.E.2d 444 (1940).
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philosophy of the Ohio and New York courts. In the state of Wash-
ington,6 where the ability to foresee the exact injury was more difficult
than in the case just discussed, the court found no problem in finding
a physical education teacher liable who left the gymnasium unsuper-
vised when during his absence a boy dragged a girl into an adjacent
room and perpetrated an immoral act.
Supervision of Normal Size Classrooms
In spite of many assertions of teachers that necessity prompts fre-
quent leaving of classrooms unsupervised, a thoughtful analysis of
most concrete situations points to the fact that there are actually few
occasions when it can be said that worthwhile educational purposes
support leaving the room for any appreciable period of time. It would
be probable, although by no means certain, that courts would find
more occasion to conclude that there was no negligence if the teacher
was out of the room for a short period of time for a purpose connected
with an educational matter.
Supervision of Certain Special Groups
The "under the circumstances" phrase in the basic test for negli-
gence would often dictate that the make-up of certain groups was
such that no prudent teacher would leave the group alone for even
a brief time. On the other hand the utility of the endeavor might
suggest that if the approach was that of the reasonable, prudent man,
such things as unsupervised study halls might be set up. If they were,
it would seem that prudence would dictate that only those pupils
would be routed into such rooms that teachers had vouched for as
reliable. It would also appear wise to support the unsupervised study
hall by enlisting the aid of a student council willing to accept the re-
sponsibility of reporting infractions of study hall regulations.
Certainly small study groups of five to six could be left unsuper-
vised provided there was not in the group a known and consistent
trouble maker. This is because the reasonable prudent parent would
not hesitate to leave certain small groups unsupervised in his home.
As to the question concerning when a small group becomes too large,
this presents the typical problem of the line of demarcation with which
the law is often confronted and as to which the answer could vary
from jury to jury and court to court.
Supervision During Recess
The responsibility to supervise elementary school pupils during
recess periods rests upon the individual teacher. Surely if a teacher
must supervise her group within a classroom, she would have to do
6 McLeod v. Grant County Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953).
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the same on a recess playground. Negligence has been found when
a teacher fails to enforce adequate play rules, which the court felt
was the cause of the injury.
7
Supervision of Shops, Laboratories, Gymnasiums,
Swimming Pools, Playgrounds
A particular responsibility rests upon teachers who instruct in areas
where students work with equipment, materials and machines which
are inherently dangerous if care is not used. Specifically, shop, physical
education, science and home economics teachers work in such areas.
The teacher not only has the duty to supervise carefully. He also has
the duty to instruct in the proper use of equipment.8 There is often
a tendency on the part of shop, science and home economics teachers
to concentrate on the work of a few conducting a particular experi-
ment in a laboratory or shop. In view of the potential danger that
exists, conservative advice suggests that such concentration should not
be too obvious for an unreasonable time. On the other hand a New
York court made clear that there is no requirement that the teacher
have under constant and unremitting scrutiny the precise spots where-
in every phase of activity is being pursued. Nor is there any compul-
sion that the general supervision be continuous and direct.9 This
philosophy is simply a frank recognition of the practicalities of the
situation.
Supervising at Dismissal and During Movement Between Classes
Particular supervisory duties exist at times of dismissal and move-
ment between classes. Under certain circumstances the duty rests
solely on the individual teacher. Since, for instance, it can reasonably
be foreseen that very young children in the primary grades jostle and
push by nature, a teacher in control of such group would be prudent
to accompany her children down stairs and along corridors at dis-
missal time. As the child becomes more mature, the factors previously
discussed, of the probability of harm and the utility of the type of
conduct, should often excuse a teacher from accompanying her group
out of the building at dismissal time and at the time of movement
7 Germond v. Board of Educ., 10 App. Div. 2d 139, 197 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1960);
Forgnone v. Salvadore Union Elementary School Dist., 41 Cal. App. 2d 423, 106 P.2d
932 (1940), involving a situation where during recess one pupil twisted another pupil's
arm; Miller v. Board of Educ., 291 N.Y. 25, 50 N.E.2d 529 (1943), presented a pupil
injured when playing on a fire escape at recess. Improper supervision was found in the
latter two cases.
8 Mastrangelo v. West Side Union High School Dist., 2 Cal. 2d 540, 42 P.2d 634
(1935).
9See Nestor v. City of New York, 28 N.Y. Misc. 2d 70, 211 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1961),
involving supervision on a playground, but the philosophy would be equally applicable
to supervision of shops and science laboratories.
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between classes.10 But as indicated hereafter in connection with the
discussion of the responsibility of administrators, some strategic super-
vision seems necessary. The planning for this rests primarily upon the
administrator.
Supervision During Lunch Periods-Before and After School
In addition to the problem of supervising children at dismissal
time and during movement between classes there exists the question
of responsibility for supervision of lunch room and playground during
lunch periods. It is obvious that because of lack of manpower, fool-
proof supervision cannot be furnished during the time allotted for
lunch. Teachers must have time to eat and relax. Prudence, however,
dictates the need for some strategic supervision. The duty to plan for
such supervision rests primarily on the administrator." It appears
probable that if the administrator sits down with his staff and faces
up to the problem of the strategic use of manpower that is available,
a court will not find any personal liability on the part of the adminis-
trator on the ground that the plan devised was the best possible under
the circumstances. Unless the plan devised is utterly arbitrary, it is
obvious that teachers must perform the duties assigned to them or
face the risk of liability if a child is injured while the teacher is not
supervising.
Later in this article discussion will deal with the matter of school
district liability. If the state of the law in a particular jurisdiction
permits the imposition of such liability, the way is open to act to
establish that the district did not make enough personnel available
for supervision of lunch room and playgrounds. It has been held, for
instance, that one teacher cannot supervise a large playground where
150 pupils of various ages play.' 2
There appears to be no need to supervise just because groups gather
before school and remain after school.'3 The school will fulfill its re-
sponsibility in respect to pupils who so gather by making reasonable
endeavors to acquaint the student body and parents as to when super-
vision will begin and end. This will place upon those who come early
and remain late the assumption of the risk.
Supervision by Uncertified School Personnel
Questions have arisen as to liability of school teachers or adminis-
trators if a child is injured while some individual other than a certified
10 Leibowitz v. Board of Educ., 112 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct., Trial Term, 1952).
"1 Thompson v. Board of Educ., 255 App. Div. 786, 6 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1938).
12 Charonnat v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 56 Cal. App. 2d 840, 133 P.2d
643 (1943).
13 Lutzker v. Board of Educ., 287 N.Y. 822, 41 N.E.2d 97 (1942).
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teacher is supervising in the room or on the playground. Such indi-
viduals may be a parent, an older child, a custodian or a guest lecturer.
Although there may occasionally arise fact situations which might seem
to give hope of using the justification of little probability of harm and
utility of the use of such supervision, it would appear that teachers
and school administrators should generally recognize the hazard in
such decision. Surely it can be foreseen that individuals without par-
ticular training in child psychology and the handling of young people
in groups will generally not have the skill to control the group. If,
therefore, horseplay results in injury, it seems likely that the teacher
or administrator would be vulnerable to liability. Illustrative is the
New York decision holding a school custodian not qualified to super-
vise a play area.14
Indeed, the legal adviser of the San Francisco Board of Education
sounds a note of caution concerning the use of practice teachers unless
there is protection granted by statute.'5 It is submitted that this would
be too conservative a viewpoint to be accepted by many courts. It
would seem that most courts could be convinced that it is necessary
to give practice teachers experience in controlling the room on their
own and that such courts would only find negligence if those who are
charged with observing the work of the practice teacher allowed her
to be on her own before it was prudent to do so.
Supervision on Field Trips
Certainly if it is necessary to supervise within classrooms, it is even
more so on field trips. It is likely that the reasonable prudent parent
yardstick will often suggest that a teacher cannot supervise the same
size group on a field trip that she can in a classroom. The utility of
such trips, when weighed against the likelihood of harm, should influ-
ence courts to permit teachers to enlist the aid of other adults who
will go along as assistants. The responsibility of the teacher would
then be realistic orientation of the duties expected from helpers and
acceptance of the responsibility to see that the assistants selected
actually do live up to their commitment to help supervise. A standard of
due care will often require that a teacher avoid taking children on cer-
tain trips if it can be foreseen that the reasonable prudent parent would
not present his child with the dangers involved. Of course, in any
decision of such sort the age of the child will be an important factor.
14 Garber v. Central High School Dist. No. 1, 251 App. Div. 214, 295 N.Y. Supp.
850 (1937).
15 Breyer, The Power to Use Student Teachers and Special Non-Professional Lec-
turers, in LAw An = ScHooL PNCIPAL 169-89 (Seitz ed. 1961).
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Field trips impose upon school personnel the most careful planning.
To avoid harassment from parents who may claim that they would
not have consented to the child going on the trip, parents should be
asked to sign permission slips. These slips should give parents complete
details as to the method of transportation, approximate time of depar-
ture and return and the destination. There is no way in which verbiage
can be put on a permission slip which will absolve teachers from the
duty to carefully supervise on field trips. A parent cannot consent to
a teacher being negligent toward his child. For the same reason a
parent cannot consent to allow a teacher to take his child on a trip
or to a destination which would not be approved by the reasonable
prudent parent.
Contributory Negligence as Defense to Failure to Supervise
A teacher charged with negligence, especially that based upon an
allegation of failure to properly supervise, may allege contributory
negligence or in those jurisdictions which follow the doctrine try to
reduce damages through a comparative negligence formula. Under
some sets of facts the teacher can succeed. If, for example, strong evi-
dence indicated that an older pupil had been thoroughly instructed
in the danger of using certain chemicals and was warned not to use
them but nevertheless did so while the teacher was out of the room
and was seriously injured, the court would undoubtedly find contribu-
tory negligence. The problem with contributory negligence as a defense
is that the court is going to face up to the fact that the yardstick it
must use is that degree of care which the great mass of children of
like age, intelligence and experience would ordinarily exercise under
the circumstances. The prudent teacher would not want to take too
many chances that a jury or court would be liberal in the application
of such a standard. The problem is that the court may often conclude
that although pupils recognize that a warning of danger has been given,
they do not fully comprehend the extent of the danger. The court is
likely to see in the failure to properly supervise the creating of an
improper atmosphere of temptation to experiment. The duty of one
charged with supervising to warn of danger often exists even though
a pupil could recognize some danger. In a California situation the
teacher failed to warn that the guard on a power saw was broken.
Although the pupil could observe the fact and knew of the danger,
the court held that although the pupil did know there was some danger,
he did not know the amount of it.16
16 Ridge v. Boulder Creek Union Jr.-Sr. High School Dist., 60 Cal. App 2d 453,
140 P.2d 990 (1943).
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Responsibilities Other than for Supervising
There are a number of occasions other than in the area of super-
vision which frequently present the issue of due care toward pupils.
First Aid and Medical Treatment
The mere plea of good Samaritan will not excuse the school man
who gives medical attention when he should recognize that the injury
is a serious one and appreciate that he does not know how to administer
proper treatment.1
7
Due care in such circumstances would be to take reasonably pru-
dent steps to summon as quickly as possible the emergency attention
that is necessary. Depending upon the circumstances this might range
from calling a nurse, doctor, or first aid expert in the school building,
contacting a physician or a police emergency squad. Parents or guard-
ians should also be notified promptly.
If school personnel improperly treat an injury which does not pre-
sent an emergency, it is even more apparent that due care has not
been used.'
Requesting Pupil Aid
Teachers and administrators subject themselves to liability for
injury when they request aid which they should recognize is beyond
the experience and physical capacity of the child. An obvious example
would be asking pupils to move a heavy piano in a situation which
requires lifting. Even though the pupils asked to help may be physi-
cally strong, it can be foreseen that since they do not have experience
as movers of heavy equipment, they may injure themselves in the
effort. Also it would not be prudent to ask students unused to climb-
ing high ladders to decorate the high ceiling of a gymnasium for a
school dance or other affair.
Sending Pupils Home During School Day
Several possibilities for incurring liability suggest themselves in
connection with sending pupils home during the school day. If the
parent is not contacted ahead of time and permission received a teacher
who sent a child home for disciplinary reasons would likely be held
capable of foreseeing that the individual might not go home and might
go to places which would subject him to danger of harm. The parent
would also need to be contacted before an ill child was sent home.
If the child could not get into the home and his illness became more
acute, the teacher would likely be vulnerable. Furthermore, in the
17 Conner v. Winton, 8 Ind. 315 (1856); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165
(1884).
18 Guerrieri v. Tyson, 147 Pa. Super. 239, 24 A.2d 468 (1942).
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instance of the ill child prudence would often dictate that he should
not be allowed to leave the school without assistance.
If a teacher or administrator contemplates sending a young child
home during school hours, she should, as a reasonable prudent person,
reflect upon whether she is exposing the child to dangers to which it
would not be exposed if it were dismissed at the normal hour. For
instance, if the child would be exposed to a very dangerous crossing
when no patrol help was on duty and it was injured, it would place
the teacher in a precarious position as respects liability.
Keeping Pupils After School
The principle just previously enunciated should be kept in mind
when a teacher or administrator is thinking of keeping a pupil after
school. If by doing so the child is exposed to dangers to which he
should not be subjected because of his age, the practice is hazardous.
A danger in addition to exposing young children to an unpatrolled
dangerous crossing is that which could exist in some neighborhoods
if girls are kept after dark. Obvious hazards could arise if pupils trav-
eling long distances miss bus connections. Of course if the teacher
arranges for a child to be picked up by a parent or a reputable party
whom the parent delegates, the problem is solved.
Sending Students on Errands
A liability problem can arise for the teacher in connection with
sending pupils on errands. This would happen, however, only if the
child is injured while on the assignment.
Caution would suggest not sending a student off the school grounds
on any errand that was for anything other than an educational pur-
pose. If the errand is for a good educational purpose it would seem
the hazard of injury is small if the pupil selected is not put in a position
which confronts him with dangers any more serious than is usual at
his present age and experience. Naturally it would be unwise to select
any student who had demonstrated irresponsibility. Teachers can
incur liability for sending pupils on errands within a school building
if the facts establish that the teacher could have foreseen that the
child would encounter danger of harm. For instance, if an art teacher
sent a child to the storeroom to secure some paint and knew that to
get to the paint the child would have to move some stage equipment,
the teacher would surely be found negligent if the child would move
the equipment and it fell on and injured her.
There is another aspect to sending a pupil on an errand off the
school grounds. If he is sent for a sound educational purpose it can be
argued that he is made an agent of the school, and if he is negligent
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and injures someone the school district may be liable under a doctrine
that will be discussed hereafter.
Transporting Pupils
School bus drivers are liable for injuries their negligence causes
pupils. In addition to being required to use the care which is imposed
upon the driver of any automobile, the bus driver should be prudent
at times of loading and unloading. Opening the bus door before bring-
ing the bus to a stop was held to be negligence. 19 So too is the stopping
of a bus away from the curb and not at the regular bus stop.20 Drivers
must be alert for the presence of children on school grounds and drive
with great caution. One court, pointing out that often the age of the
child should be considered, indicated that a bus driver could be found
to have a duty to warn pupils about approaching vehicles at the time
of unloading.21 Failure to discharge pupils in a safe place is dangerous.
A driver who stopped his bus without drawing to the right side of the
road was held to be negligent and responsible when a pupil was in-
jured by a speeding car, even though the driver failed to stop for the
school bus as required by statute.22 A North Carolina court found a
duty resting on a bus driver to see that children who must cross the
road after leaving the bus are in a place of safety before he starts his
vehicle.
28
A driver was found negligent when he started his bus suddenly
while a child was standing in the aisle.24 Similarly negligence was
found when a driver pulled to a halt without warning after traveling
at a high rate of speed and a pupil was thrown out of the bus.
25
Drivers have some responsibility for supervising as well as operat-
ing the vehicle. If rowdyism is such that a reasonable man would
become aware of it the driver has a duty to stop the bus and quell
the disturbance.
26
School administrators have the responsibility for setting up a plan
for the orderly loading and unloading of buses.
As will be indicated hereafter, negligent bus drivers may impose
liability upon school districts. Of course, if the transportation system
is operated by a private contractor, liability would rest on the private
19 Taylor v. Cobble, 28 Tenn. App. 167, 187 S.W.2d 648 (1945).
20 Webb v. City of Seattle, 22 Wash. 2d 596, 157 P.2d 312 (1945).
21 Cartwright v. Graves, 182 Tenn. 114, 184 S.W.2d 373 (1944).
22 Davidson v. Home, 86 Ga. App. 220, 71 S.E.2d 464 (1952).
23 Greene v. Mitchell County Bd. of Educ., 237 N.C. 336, 75 S.E.2d 129 (1953).
24 Van Clare v. Illinois Coach Co., 344 Ill. App. 127, 100 N.E.2d 398 (1951).
25 Roberts v. Baker, 57 Ga. App. 733, 196 S.E. 104 (1938).
2
0 Maley v. Children's Bus Service, Inc., 203 Misc. 559, 117 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1952),
aft'd, 282 App. Div. 920, 125 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1953).
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contractor. The district might likely be held for direct negligence
if it did not require the private contractor to carry adequate insurance.
Use of a School Patro
2 7
There are a number of states which by statute sanction operating
pupil patrols at crossings near schools. If the legislature does not
sanction setting up a patrol, some responsible school board attorneys
take the view that students should not be used on a patrol because
it can be foreseen that in an emergency a young patrolman might,
in the course of carrying out his duties, put himself in the path of
danger. In practice many school administrators establish student pa-
trols, even though they are not authorized to do so by a specific statute.
This may be justified on the basis of utility and the greater good versus
likelihood of harm. There is enough logic, however, in the position of
those who argue for caution in setting up a student patrol to induce
the advice that if a permissive statute does not exist, the school admin-
istrator should not set up a patrol unless efforts to get responsible adult
help have failed. If funds are not available to secure adult assistance,
if responsible volunteer adult help is not available, and if police assist-
ance cannot be secured, it would seem that the courts would uphold
as reasonable the decision to set up a patrol on the balance of utility
versus probability of harm. In areas where a district has lost govern-
mental immunity, it could be that courts would be induced to hold
that the district had the responsibility to furnish adult assistance.
All authorities agree that a student should never be asked to stand
in the street to direct traffic.
Responsibilities in Connection with
Buildings, Grounds and Equipment
As respect liability of the individual teacher or administrator for
defects in buildings, grounds and equipment which are the cause of
injury to a pupil, the decision will be based upon whether under the
circumstances the schoolman, as a reasonable prudent person, should
have checked for the defect or have noted it. The shop teacher should
be careful to frequently check the condition of his equipment for de-
fects that could be discerned by ordinary inspection. The ordinary
teacher would not be charged with the same duty of vigilance to check
buildings and grounds. The administrator, in some school systems,
may have more responsibility in such respect, although in large school
systems the primary responsibility for periodic checks would undoubt-
27 For a more detailed discussion of the legality of the school patrol see Hetzel,
State and Local Salary Legislation Applicable to Principals, in LAw AND T=E SCHOOL
P mcipAL 105-19 (Seitz ed. 1961).
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edly rest on a building or grounds department. However, teachers and
administrators who become aware of dangerous defects have a duty
to report them to the proper authorities. Often, to the extent it is
physically possible, teachers and administrators would have a duty to
block off the dangerous area or stop the use of the defective piece of
equipment. It would also be their duty to warn pupils of known
hazards.
Defects in buildings, grounds and equipment which induce injury
to pupils seem particularly to stimulate legal action against the school
district. If, as will be discussed hereafter, the law of the jurisdiction
permits recovery against the district, it is vulnerable if it or its em-
ployees knew or should have known of the condition and failed to
take corrective steps to remedy or protect against it within a reason-
able time after actual notice. If the hazardous condition exists for an
undue length of time, it may become difficult for the school district
to rebut the presumption that it should have known of the situation.
It will be useful to present some fact situations which have pro-
duced liability as a result of injury to pupils who allege defects in
buildings, grounds and equipment. New York imposed liability after
a pupil fell on an unlighted stairway when there was also a gap in
the handrailing.28 In California recovery was permitted when a loos-
ened locker attached to a gymnasium wall fell on a pupil.29 Washing-
ton awarded damages when a top-heavy piano on casters was left in
a playroom in such a position that children had to move it and when
it was being moved it overturned and injured a pupil. In another
Washington case the court found negligence in permitting an elevated
step at an exit.30 A pupil recovered in New York when he was injured
when his sweater caught in a shop machine. No aprons were furnished
to protect against such happening.31 A pupil studying carpentry who
fell from a scaffolding without a handrail was permitted to recover.
32
However, when a boy was pulled down by another boy and injured
because he fell on a clinker on a school playground, the New York
court did not find the unsafe surface of the playground the proximate
cause of the injury. Rather, the court said the cause was the interven-
tion of another pupil.33 This New York case represents a court obviously
28 Hovey v. State of New York, 287 N.Y. 663, 39 N.E.2d 287 (1941).
29 Freud v. Oakland Bd. of Educ., 28 Cal. App. 2d 246, 82 P.2d 197 (1938).
30 Kidwell v. School District No. 300, Whitman County, 54 Wash. 2d 672, 335 P.2d
805 (1959); Ekerson v. Ford's Prairie School District No. 11 of Lewis County, 3 Wash.
2d 475, 101 P.2d 345 (1940).
31 Edkins v. Board of Educ., 287 N.Y. 505, 41 N.E.2d 75 (1942).
32 Weber v. State, 267 App. Div. 325, 45 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1944), aff'd, 53 N.Y.S.2d
598 (Ct. CI. 1945).
33 May v. Board of Educ., 295 N.Y. 948, 68 N.E.2d 44 (1946).
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bending over backwards. If the clinker was known to be on the play-
ground, it is likely many courts would conclude that an event of the
very type which happened could be foreseen.
The Position of the School District
The discussion to this point has established that individual school
men can be held to respond in damages for their negligent acts which
result in injury to pupils.
It now becomes appropriate to discuss the extent of the liability
of a school district for its direct negligence and the extent to which
the district will be held liable for lack of due care of teachers and
administrators. Obviously if a school district is liable, since it has a
deeper pocket than an individual schoolman, injured plaintiffs who
feel they have a cause of action will most likely sue the district.
Statistically the rule in the vast majority of jurisdictions still clothes
the district with governmental immunity. This immunity applies to
the negligent act of the district itself and the negligent acts of its
officers, agents, or employees. The immunity also protects in the
case of injuries arising from dangerous or improper care of buildings,
grounds or equipment.
The philosophy supporting this far-reaching protection of govern-
mental entities is often explained by the old common law fiction that
the king (the Government) can do no wrong. More realistically, the
philosophy is grounded on the belief that school revenue is to be used
only for educational purposes and not disbursed to pay for injuries to
pupils. There is the analogous thinking that requiring school districts
to respond in damages may impoverish the school district to the detri-
ment of the educational program.
In a minority of jurisdictions developments have qualified or abro-
gated the rule of immunity. In Arizona"4 the court imposed liability
on the district after it found it was engaged in a proprietary function.
In the particular case, a school district was required to respond in
damages to reimburse one injured when a railing broke. The injured
party had paid a fee to get into a stadium which the district leased
for a football game. Admission was charged for the game. In Penn-
sylvania the school district, although not required by law to do so,
operated a summer recreation program open to all who paid a fee.
The court 5 felt the effort was proprietary and permitted action against
the district based on the allegation that its employee had been guilty
34 Sawaya v. Tucson High School Dist. No. 1, 78 Ariz. 389, 281 P.2d 105 (1955).
35 Morris v. School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 144 A.2d 737 (1958).
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of negligence in connection with the drowning of a child in a swim-
ming pool which was used as part of the recreation program.
New York36 determined that a district was liable when a nuisance
which it maintained caused injury to a pupil. In the case a pupil, while
playing at recess, stumbled over a junk pile which the school main-
tained in a corner of its grounds. Connecticut 3 7 followed the same
nuisance doctrine and imposed liability for injury sustained through
use of dangerous play equipment.
The vast majority of jurisdictions have not seemed willing to im-
pose liability upon school districts through the nuisance theory. Fur-
thermore, very few cases have recognized the exception grounded on
proprietary function.
In 1959 a new development revealed a court doing away with
immunity by judicial decree. The Supreme Court of Illinois bluntly
disposed of many arguments which had been used to support govern-
mental immunity. As to the divine right of kings the court stated:
The whole doctrine of governmental immunity from liability for tort
rests upon a rotten foundation. It is almost incredible that in this
modem age of comparative sociological enlightenment, and in a re-
public, the medieval absolutism supposed to be implicit in the maxim,
"the King can do no wrong," should exempt the various branches of
the government from liability for their torts, and that the entire burden
of damage resulting from the wrongful acts of the government should
be imposed upon the single individual who suffers the injury, rather
than distributed among the entire community constituting the gov-
ernment . 3.
The protection of the public funds excuse for immunity was struck
down with the reasoning that "If tax funds can properly be spent to
pay premiums on liability insurance, there seems to be no good reason
why they cannot be spent to pay the liability itself in the absence of
insurance."" 9 The feeling that abolishment of immunity would produce
grave problems of school finance was countered with the statement,
"taxation is not the subject matter of judicial concern where justice
to the individual citizen is involved. It is the business of other depart-
ments of government to provide the funds required to pay the damages
assessed against them by the courts."40 In facing up to argument that
only the legislature could change the rule respecting immunity the
36 Popow v. Central School Dist., 277 N.Y. 538, 13 N.E. 2d 463 (1938).
7 Bush v. City of Norwalk, 122 Conn. 426, 189 AtI. 608 (1937).
38 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 11, 21, 163 N.E.2d
89, 94 (1959) (quoting Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 88, 136 P.2d 480, 482
(1943)).
39 Id. at 23, 163 N.E.2d at 95.
40 Ibid. (quoting Greene, Freedom of Litigation, 38 ILL. L. RE v. 355, 378 (1944)).
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Illinois court pronounced, "We closed our courtroom doors without
legislative help, and we can likewise open them."41 In decisions which
followed the one in Illinois, the States of Wisconsin,42 Minnesota43 and
Arizona44 used judicial decisions to do away with the governmental
immunity doctrine.
The legislatures of Illinois, Wisconsin and Minnesota have all re-
acted to the judicial decision of their courts abrogating immunity.
Illinois limited to a maximum of $10,000.00 the amount of damages
that can be recovered for each separate cause of action.45 Wisconsin
placed its limit at $25,000.00.46 Minnesota completely nullified the
decision of its Supreme Court.
47
In varying degrees certain states have by legislation imposed upon
school districts tort liability.
It appears that New York 48 has extended liability under the doc-
trine respondeat superior to school districts for the negligent acts of
school personnel. This was the position taken in 1962 by the appellate
division of the Supreme Court of New York. The court felt this was
a logical extension of section 8 of the Court of Claims Act and, further-
more, noted that for a great many years boards of education have been
held liable for their own negligence. The New York Supreme Court
admitted that the Court of Appeals has as yet not passed upon the
question of respondeat superior. New York also has "save harmless"49
legislation which places upon school districts liability for injuries due
to negligence of teachers or other staff members acting in the discharge
of their duties within the scope of employment. Interpreting the "save
harmless" provision pertaining to districts having a population of less
than a million, the New York court noted the legislative language indi-
411d. at 25, 163 N.E.2d at 96 (quoting Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital
Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 178, 260 P.2d 765, 774 (1959)).
42 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
43 Spanel v. School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
44 Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
45 Srm-Huutn ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122 § 821-31.
46 West's Wisconsin Legislative Service, Chapter 198 Laws 1963 Regular Session,
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.43, in ... in addition to placing the limit at $25,000 provides that
no punitive damages shall be allowed or recoverable in any action. Furthermore the legis-
lation states that no suit shall be brought against a political corporation, governmental
subdivision or any agency thereof or against its officers, officials, agents or employees
for acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
47 Legislation passed at the 1963 session re-establishes the governmental immunity
rule. This legislation is to expire on July 1, 1968.
48 Dominic v. Mercurio, 17 App. Div. 2d 342, 234 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1962).
4 9 NEw YoRK Enuc. LAw § 3023 pertaining to districts having a population less than
one million; § 2560 relative to districts with a population over one million.
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cating that "The Board of Education... shall not be subject to the duties
imposed by this section unless such teacher, or member of the super-
visory and administrative staff or employee, within ten days of the
time he is served with any summons, complaint, process, notice, de-
mand or pleading, delivers the original or a copy of the same to such
Board of Education. . . ." This language and section 3813 of the
education law of the State of New York induced the court to conclude
that it was sufficient for a plaintiff to serve notice of claim only on the
school district. It was not required to serve notice on teachers indi-
vidually. However, as directed by the "save harmless" statute, the
teachers must deliver the summons and complaint to the school dis-
tract within ten days after the receipt of the same. The court explained
that, unlike a municipal corporation, the teachers need no opportunity
to investigate the claim and consequently need no advance notice
thereof. The court stressed that the teachers would not have to pay
any judgment against them.50 Connecticut and New Jersey5l also have
"save harmless" statutes. These courts have decided that the legisla-
ture did not do away with the governmental immunity doctrine to
the extent of sanctioning an injured party to sue a school district di-
rectly. It was indicated the injured party must first proceed against
the individual charged with breach of duty.52
Permissive legislation is written into law in some states. Oregon3
permits "any county, city, town, district, board or other body" at its
own expense to provide a defense for any public officer or employee
who is sued in a civil action alleging negligence in the course of em-
ployment. In addition the public employer can also undertake to pay
court costs, attorneys' fees and a judgment if one is rendered. The
statute seems clearly to apply to school districts, and in 1962 the Ore-
gon Attorney General gave an informal opinion that it did. Wyoming 54
has a permissive "save harmless" statute. Provisions are quite similar
to the mandatory law in New York. Massachusetts 5 also has a per-
missive law.
Hawaii has by legislation waived its governmental immunity.56 As
early as 1869 Washington passed generally worded legislation bearing
upon governmental immunity. It provides, "An action may be main-
5o Sandak v. Tuxedo Union School Dist. No. 3, 308 N.Y. 226, 124 N.E.2d 295
(1954).
51 CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 10-235 (1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:5-50.2 to -50.4.
52 Swainbank v. Coombs, 19 Conn. Supp. 391, 115 A.2d 468 (1955); Tripus v. Peter-
son, 11 N.J. Super. 282, 78 A.2d 149 (1950).
53 OaE. 11Ev. STAT. §§ 243.610, 243.620.
54 Wyo. STAT. § 21-158 (1957).
55 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 41, § 100C.
56 HAWu REV. LAws ch. 245A (Supp. 1960).
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tained against a county or other of the public corporations as described
in (the preceding section which named school districts) ...for an
injury to the rights of the plaintiff arising from some act or omission
of such county or other public corporation."57 Washington made clear
by amendment in 1917 that it would not do away with immunity for
claims arising out of manual training, playground and athletic situa-
tions.58 As recently as 1961 the Supreme Court of Washington empha-
sized that the liability of school districts for negligence is not shielded
by the doctrine of governmental immunity but that the district does
have absolute immunity as regards injuries resulting from negligence
in connection with the use of athletic and manual training equipment.59
All states have not been as liberal in interpreting and doing away
with governmental immunity under a statute that contains the general
language of that found in Washington. In facing up to a quite similar
provision Oregon concluded that the legislature merely re-enacted the
common law rule that a public entity is liable for negligence only
when it is performing a private function. It then suggested that school
districts perform only public functions.60
The Position of the School District in California
The position of the school district in California will be of particular
interest to the readers of this law journal. The statutory pronouncement
which appeared first in 1923 decreed that "the governing board of any
school district is liable as such in the name of the district for any judg-
ment against the district on account of injury to person or property
arising because of the negligence of the district, or its officers or em-
ployees."61 This pronouncement clearly indicated that school districts
were liable for their own negligence and the negligence of the per-
sonnel of the school district. The California Supreme Court in 1961 in
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District62- made clear that it would no
longer follow the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court decided
at the same time Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District.6 In
a dictum it indicated that although public employees are not liable for
their discretionary acts within the scope of their authority, the philos-
ophy of immunity might not to the same extent protect a public entity
as it does public employees.
57 WAsr. REv. CODE § 408.120.
51 WAsH. REv. CODE § 28.58.030.
59 Sherwood v. Moxee School Dist. No. 90, 58 Wash. 2d 351, 363 P.2d 138 (1961).
6 0 Antin v. Union High School Dist. No. 2, 130 Ore. 461, 280 Pac. 664 (1929).
61 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 903.
62 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961). "
63 55 Cal. 2d 224, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 359 P:2d 465 (1961).
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Following the two 1961 decisions just mentioned, the California
Legislature in 1963 passed a new governmental tort liability statute.6 4
It specifically made clear that a public entity is immune from tort
liability unless a statute can be found imposing liability in the particu-
lar situation. 5 As indicated, a statute bearing on school districts does
exist in California. The 1963 statute stresses that to the extent the
employee is personally liable, the public entity is liable for injury ap-
proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee within the
scope of his employment.66 This clarifies the pronouncement in the
Lipman case because public employees have immunity from liability
for discretionary acts.
By stating specifically that a public entity becomes liable for dam-
ages if it fails to exercise reasonable diligence to comply with a manda-
tory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against
the risk of a particular kind of injury, the California Legislature indi-
cated it did not premise all school district liability on a determination
of whether the public employees would have been immune or liable.67
A lengthy part of the new 1963 California legislation deals with public
entities as occupiers of land."8 An analysis of the provisions in this
respect reveals that liability is premised on the failure of the public
landowner to take reasonable precautions after it knows, or has reason
to know, that the property is in a condition that creates a substantial
risk of harm to individuals whom it can foresee will use the property.
The new 1963 legislation reveals California's type of "save harm-
less" statute.0 9 The legislation requires detailed study. The salient pro-
vision is that "if an employee or former employee of a public entity
requests the public entity to defend him against any claim or action
against him for an injury arising out of an act or omission occurring
within the scope of his employment as an employee of the public
utility, and such request is made in writing in less than ten days before
the day of trial, the public entity shall pay any judgment based thereon
or any compromise or settlement of the claim or action to which the
public entity has agreed." Further, the legislation provides that if the
public entity conducts the defense of an employee or former employee,
it shall pay any judgment based thereon. There is a provision that the
public entity can reserve the right not to pay the judgment until it
614 CAL. STAT. 1963, ch. 1681, p. 3266; see also CAL. STAT. 1963, ch. 1683, p. 3296,
and ch. 1715, p. 3369.
65 CAL. Gov. CODE § 815.
66 CAL. Gov. CODE § 815.2.
67 CAL. Gov. CODE § 815.6.
68 CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 830-40.6.
69 CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 825-25.6. See also CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 995-96.6.
May, 1964]
is established that the injury arose out of an act or omission occurring
within the scope of employment. The law also provides that the public
entity can recover from the public employee any judgment which it
may have paid if it is established that the public employee or former
public employee acted or failed to act because of actual fraud, cor-
ruption or malice.
California has inserted a provision in its new law intended to insure
that public entities will pay judgments recovered against them. There
is a requirement that local public entities are to levy taxes or other-
wise provide for revenue sufficient to pay outstanding judgments.
70
An arrangement can be made to pay a judgment in installments over
a period of ten years if current payment will produce an undue hard-
ship.7 1 If local voters sanction, public entities in order to raise funds
to pay judgments may issue bonds payable over forty years.72 Finally,
such entities are given power to insure against liability and to enter
into group liability insurance plans with other public entities.7 3
Liability of Individual School Board Members
School Board members are not employees of the district but officers
of the state. The rules of liability applicable to school personnel are,
therefore, not controlling.
Generally, school board members are not personally liable for
negligence when the negligence is that of the corporate body and not
that of the individuals. 74 Board members are not liable as a result of
the negligence of school personnel. 75
Another protection is found for individual members of school
boards in the judicial philosophy that damages resulted from the honest
exercise of discretion. Illustrative is the North Carolina76 case where
repairs were ordered on the school stadium. Under the direction of
members of the board cement blocks were hauled to the stadium and
stacked by direction of the board members. During the course of a
game a spectator was severely injured when the pile of blocks fell on
him. The spectator ultimately died. The court in finding no individual
liability commented that "in the instant case the School Trustees and
70 CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 970-70.4.
71 CAL. GoV. CODE § 970.6.
72 CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 975-78.8.
73 CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 989-91.2, 11007A.
74 Daniels v. Board of Educ., 191 Mich. 339, 158 N.W. 23 (1916) involving injuries
growing out of faulty construction of a school building; Perkins v. Trask, 95 Mont. 1,
23 P.2d 982 (1933) concerning swimming pool not properly supervised.
75 Consolidated School Dist. No. 1 v. Wright, 128 Okla. 193, 261 Pac. 953 (1927);
Johnson City Bd. of Educ. v. Ray, 154 Tenn. 179, 289 S.W. 502 (1926).
76 Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1, 68 S.E.2d 783 (1952).
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Park Commissioners were engaged in official, administrative acts in-
volving the exercise of discretion.... It is not alleged that their conduct
was either corrupt or malicious. Nor does it appear that they were
acting beyond the scope of their duties."17
In contrast to the philosophy absolving from liability on the ground
that the board was exercising discretion, we have a judicial pronounce-
ment that board members are personally liable in tort when they fail
to carry out ministerial duties. In some cases the ministerial duties
are clear but in others it is hard to understand why the court found the
act ministerial instead of discretionary.
In a KentuckyW 8 case a statute made it a duty of the board of edu-
cation to require private bus drivers carrying school children to take
out liability insurance. It is clearly understandable why the court
found a ministerial duty and imposed liability on the individual board
members when the facts revealed that an injured party stood to suffer
because the board had not secured the insurance. On the other hand
the finding by an Indiana court 9 of ministerial duty is difficult to
understand. Under a set of facts not essentially different from those
in the North Carolina case just discussed the court placed liability on
individual school board members on the ground that their acts were
ministerial. Under the facts the school board had each year conducted
a "field day exhibition." Temporary stands were constructed in which
spectators were seated. The board employed a carpenter to build the
stands under the direction of the clerk of the board. There was a defect
in construction which caused the seats to fall and seriously injure a
number of people. The court stated that duty is discretionary "when
it involves on the part of the officer to determine whether or not he
should perform a certain act, and, if so in what particular way.
" s
Turning to the facts of the case the court decided that the board was
performing a discretionary act in determining that there should be
field day exercises and the manner in which they should be carried
on but that "the duties performed in making preparation for such field
day exercises and the general management thereof were ministerial
acts."s'
It is probable that most courts would not make the distinction as
the Indiana court made it. Certainly most judicial bodies recognize
that sound public policy dictates giving a high degree of protection
to individual school board members. It is recognized that board mem-
7 Id. at 7, 68 S.E.2d at 788.
78 Bronaugh v. Murray, 294 Ky. 715, 172 S.W.2d 591 (1943).
70 Adams v. Schneider, 71 Ind. App. 249, 124 N.E. 718 (1919).
so Id. at 255, 124 N.E. at 720.
81 Id. at 258, 124 N.E. at 721.
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bers for the most part serve the public gratuitiously. Certain it is that
if board members were to be held to respond in damages for mere mis-
takes in judgment, it would be difficult to attract high calibre people
to serve. It would be even more difficult if liability were to attach
because of the negligence of school personnel.
Individual school board members will be liable for harm caused
by acts which are corrupt or malicious.
Use of Liability Insurance82
As this article works toward a conclusion, it is appropriate to dis-
cuss the use of liability insurance. There has already been some ref-
erence to its use in California.
The courts have been confronted with the question as to whether
if a school district procures liability insurance, it waives its govern-
mental immunity if the jurisdiction still affords such protection. The
majority viewpoint holds that the coverage does not affect immunity.8 3
Unless a statute intervenes, most courts will not accept a suit against
an immune school district even if there is insurance. The school dis-
trict, of course, may overcome this result by seeing to it that the insur-
ance policy contains a provision that a party claiming injury may
maintain a direct action against the insurance company and that the
company cannot raise the defense of governmental immunity. A few
jurisdictions have held that when insurance coverage has been pur-
chased, school district immunity is removed for tort liability to the
extent of the insurance.8 4 The philosophy is that there is no longer any
need for the immunity doctrine when insurance protection is secured.
Statutes in some states expressly permit the district to purchase
liability insurance. Some of these statutes specifically provide that the
immunity of the district is not waived and some clearly state that im-
munity is waived to the extent of the insurance obtained. Some make
it definite that the insurer may not assert the defense of governmental
immunity and that the insurance company is the party to be sued.
A 1961 United States Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare Office of Education publication 5 reveals that twenty-two states
required districts to carry liability insurance on publicly owned school
busses. A number of states authorized school districts to provide with
82 The scope of this section does not cover insurance which provides for compensa-
tion to the party injured through an accident. The section deals only with liability insur-
ance which is designed to protect in instances where school personnel or school districts
are negligent.
83 See, e.g., Supler v. School Dist., 407 Pa. 657, 182 A.2d 535 (1962).
84 Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consol. School Dist., 348 Ill. App. 567, 109
N.E.2d 636 (1952); Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 26, 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1961).
85 Featherston & Morray, State Provisions for School Bus Insurance, Circular No. 486.
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public funds liability insurance which will give protection to officers
or employees who may be called upon to respond in damages as the
outgrowth of a successful action based upon allegations of negligent
acts or omissions in the course of school employment.
In respect to the wisdom of the purchase of liability insurance by
individual teachers or administrators it is apparent that the decision
will be based upon a number of factors. Does the state have a "save
harmless" statute? Has the state purchased liability coverage which
will adequately protect the individual school man? The state or local
education association or school board attorney should be in a position
to give the individual realistic advice as to the need for personal cover-
age. If the situation dictates the need, the individual should buy an
adequate amount. Consultation with an insurance agent will reveal
that the cost of adequate coverage is little more than that for an inade-
quate amount.
Conclusion
Since there has been so much discussion of liability in this article
it seems necessary to stress again that neither the teacher nor the
school district is the insurer of the safety of children against pure
accidents. Teachers and administrators need not be apprehensive
about the imposition of liability. The record reveals that courts recog-
nize that the teacher and administrator work in a complex situation
and have given every indication that they will reasonably apply the
yardstick which tests for negligence when the allegation is that a
schoolman has fallen down in his duty of care and a pupil has been
injured. Teachers, however, would be ill-advised to rely upon the most
liberal theory that can be presented. It is again suggested that the
conservative approach of this article is best calculated to keep the
schoolman out of the hands of juries. It is submitted that this approach
will not put the educator in a legal strait jacket which will interfere
with his ability to best develop the pupils under his charge.
The existence of "save harmless" statutes and liability insurance
should not be looked upon by the truly professional schoolman as pro-
tection which will cause him to think less of his legal responsibilities
to avoid negligence which may affect pupils. He will fully appreciate
a professional need to do otherwise. He will understand that money
damages do not fully compensate an injured pupil. From the utterly
materialistic viewpoint he will realize that he may impair his standing
with his employer if his negligence too wantonly and too often imposes
a liability upon the employer and too often affects relations with par-
ents and school patrons.
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